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Risking Criminal Liability in Cultural Property 
Transactions 
Karin Orenstein† 
“It’s my nature,” [Michael Steinhardt] said.  “As an investor, I 
welcomed the qualities of risk in all sorts of investments, and I 
didn’t necessarily shy away from risk.”1 
 
After the Dubai trip in 2010, Mr. Carroll said he twice told [Steve] 
Green to end the purchase negotiations because of “issues of 
provenance” with the cuneiform tablets.  He said Mr. Green told 
him, “My family is not averse to risk.”  Mr. Green did not dispute 
Mr. Carroll’s account.2 
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Fight Heritage Claim, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 18, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
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christie-s-fight-heritage-claim [https://perma.cc/9KR9-DE5K]. 
 2 Kelly Crow, Hobby Lobby Scion Spent Millions on Biblical Relics - Then Came a 
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I. Introduction 
One of the concerns attending a cultural property transaction is 
the risk that the subject of the transaction is stolen property.3  
Whether a piece was looted from a site where it had rested since 
antiquity or was stolen from a more recent owner, trafficking in 
stolen property has serious potential consequences ranging from 
loss of value to criminal liability. 
 
 3 One particularly well-explored manner in which art and artifacts have come to be 
stolen is as a result of Nazi looting during the Second World War.  For a general overview 
of Nazi plunder and individual attempts to recover looted artwork, see generally Donald 
S. Burris, Restoration of a Culture: A California Lawyer’s Lengthy Quest to Restitute Nazi-
Looted Art, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 277 (2020) (providing an overview of Nazi looting and a 
chronology of American legal cases pertaining thereto); see also generally Marc 
Masurovsky, A Comparative Look at Nazi Plundered Art, Looted Antiquities, & Stolen 
Indigenous Objects, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 497 (2020) (discussing looted indigenous art and 
Nazi plunder, as well as the sociological implications thereof); Simon J. Frankel, The 
HEAR Act & Laches After Three Years, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 441 (2020) (discussing 
conflicting court decisions relating to Holocaust-era looted art, the 2016 HEAR Act, and 
the equitable doctrine of latches). 
Another way in which cultural property comes to be stolen is from pillaging 
archaeologically-rich nations.  For a discussion of the legal issues such pillaging raises, 
see generally Patty Gerstenblith, Provenience & Provenance Intersecting with 
International Law in the Market for Antiquities, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 457 (2020) (discussing 
the application of international laws and U.S. domestic laws on looted art to the context of 
plundered archaeological artifacts).  For a discussion of the political calculus involved in 
the repatriation of such artifacts, see generally Leila Amineddoleh, The Politicizing of 
Cultural Heritage, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 333 (2020) (discussing the repatriation of cultural 
heritage and the political calculations involved).  Finally, for an overview of how the 
American civil asset forfeiture system can assist in such repatriations, see generally Stefan 
Cassella, Recovering Stolen Art & Antiquities Under the Forfeiture Laws: Who Is Entitled 
to the Property When There Are Conflicting Claims, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 393 (2020) 
(providing an overview of civil asset forfeiture laws and how they work to assist in the 
recovery of looted cultural patrimony). 
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Buyers and sellers seeking to avoid dealing in stolen property 
look to a piece’s “provenance,” its history of ownership over time.4  
Provenance records can be used to demonstrate the legality of one’s 
ownership and possession of a cultural object.5  However, given the 
lack of standardization or regulation of provenance in the art 
market, provenance records can also be easily falsified, making 
purchases of cultural property risky.6  Some dishonest dealers 
simply add a false provenance sentence to their invoices, while 
others create forgeries with painstaking attention to detail.7  
Consider the efforts undertaken by Jonathan Tokeley Parry to cover 
up the fact that he and his co-conspirator, Frederick Schultz, were 
selling Egyptian antiquities that had been recently exported from 
Egypt.8  First, Parry invented an old English collection named after 
his deceased great-uncle Thomas Alcock.9  Then, he used tea bags 
to artificially age labels for objects included in the fake collection.10  
Parry even used 1920s restoration techniques, followed by a “phony 
restoration report describing what he purportedly did, as a modern 
restorer, to remove the old restoration.”11 
This Comment shifts the focus from the sellers to the buyers.  
 
 4 See Provenance Guide, INT’L FOUND. FOR ART RES., 
https://www.ifar.org/Provenance_Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/WC4U-47SY]. 
 5 See id. at 2. 
 6 Id. 
 7 For example, in United States v. Khouli, the lead defendant allegedly laundered 
cultural property he acquired from others by listing his father’s 1960s collection in the 
provenance.  Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Alshdaifat’s and Lewis’s 
Omnibus Motions at 5–8, United States v. Khouli, No. 11-CR-340 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).  
Similarly, in United States v. One Iraqi Assyrian Head, the government alleged that when 
the shipper sent Iraqi and Egyptian cultural property to the United States, he listed Turkey 
as the country of origin, relying on unrelated Turkish import papers in his possession that 
he could produce to customs officials upon request.  Complaint at 5, United States v. One 
Iraqi Assyrian Head, No. 13-CV-5015 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).  Finally, in United States v. One 
Triangular Fresco Fragment, the shipper supplied a provenance to U.S. Customs & Border 
Protection that stated that the fresco was Macedonian in origin and was located in a private 
Swiss residence from 1959 through 2011.  However, further investigation revealed that the 
fresco was Italian in origin and came from a site that was not discovered until 1969, 10 
years after the false provenance placed the piece in Switzerland.  Complaint at 7–10, 
United States v. One Triangular Fresco Fragment, No. 13-CV-6286 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 8 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Brief by 
Appellee, United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1357). 
 9 Brief by Appellee, supra note 8, at 3. 
 10 Id. at 6. 
 11 Id. at 6–7 (citing trial transcript and exhibit). 
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When does a buyer of cultural property cross the line from taking a 
business risk to knowingly engaging in criminal conduct involving 
stolen property?  Is taking a calculated risk by buying a piece with 
suspect provenance an act of business acumen, or—when it turns 
out to be stolen—knowing criminal conduct?  To address these 
questions, this Comment will discuss legal and practical 
considerations surrounding these transactions and then apply the 
law to several hypothetical sales of cultural property.  Part II 
examines areas where the law is more clearly established; it will 
identify U.S. laws available to combat illicit trafficking in stolen 
property, focusing on the National Stolen Property Act (“NSPA”), 
and discuss the doctrine of conscious avoidance.  Part III explores 
areas where the law is not well fleshed out, including provenance 
and red flags in cultural property transactions.  Finally, Part IV 
applies the NSPA and the conscious avoidance doctrine to potential 
red flags in hypothetical cultural property transactions. 
II. Legal Background 
A. U.S. Laws Used to Combat Cultural Property Trafficking 
The United States is considered one of the top market countries 
for cultural property.12  At the federal level, both criminal and civil 
laws restrict the movement of stolen cultural property.  The laws 
and regulations that are commonly called upon to restrict or 
criminalize the movement of cultural property include the 
following: the Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act 
(“CPIA”), a series of civil statutes that implement the 1970 
UNESCO Convention;13 import restrictions on cultural property 
based on bilateral agreements or emergency actions promulgated 
 
 12 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-16-673, REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: CULTURAL PROPERTY: PROTECTION OF IRAQI AND SYRIAN 
ANTIQUITIES  11 (Aug. 2016), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679075.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/88XC-PVR2] (the United States is the largest “legal antiquities market” 
according to “agency officials and art market experts” consulted by the GAO); see also 
Lydia Deloumeaux, UNESCO Inst. for Statistics, The Globalization of Cultural Trade: A 
Shift in Consumption: International Flows of Cultural Goods and Services 2004–2013, at 
34, 139, UNESCO Doc. UIS/2016/CUL/TD/1 (2016),  http://dx.doi.org/10.15220/978-92-
9189-185-6-en [https://perma.cc/QB66-YLLD] (showing the United States consistently 
ranked as the number one importer of cultural goods of cultural and natural heritage from 
2004 through 2013). 
 13 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613 (2012). 
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pursuant to the CPIA;14 criminal laws prohibiting smuggling and 
false statements ;15 customs regulations contained in the Code of 
Federal Regulations, such as those requiring truthful declarations to 
U.S. Customs & Border Protection (“CBP” or “Customs”) and 
formal entry of goods valued at more than $2,500;16 and the 
NSPA.17  The United States also protects cultural property 
originating within its borders through the Archaeological Resources 
Protection Act (“ARPA”)18 and the Native American Graves 
Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”).19  In addition to 
these laws, there are multiple laws granting the United States 
authority to forfeit smuggled or stolen cultural property.20 
When cultural property originating in a foreign country is found 
in the United States under suspicious circumstances, U.S. law 
enforcement will look to the laws of the country of origin.21  If a 
foreign country maintains and enforces a patrimony law—a law that 
vests ownership of cultural property in the state—removal of 
cultural property from that country without authorization is the legal 
 
       14 19 C.F.R. §§ 12.104g, 12.104j, 12.104k (2019).  See generally Current Import 
Restrictions, BUREAU OF EDUC. & CULTURAL AFF., https://eca.state.gov/cultural-heritage-
center/cultural-property-advisory-committee/current-import-restrictions 
[https://perma.cc/B327-9UTC] (detailing a list of current U.S. international import 
restriction agreements on cultural property with various countries).  
 15 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 541–555 (2012). 
 16 19 C.F.R. § 145.12(a) (2019).  See generally 19 C.F.R. §§ 141–145 (2019) 
(providing regulations on the entry of merchandise, the entry process, special entry 
procedures, warehouse and rewarehouse entries and withdrawals, and mail importations). 
 17 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2012).  Other more 
commonly charged federal criminal laws may also be implicated by the facts of a given 
case, including mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341), wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), false 
statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956), tax crimes (26 
U.S.C. § 7201–7230), and conspiracy to violate the NSPA, customs laws, or any of the 
foregoing crimes (18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1349, 1956(h)). 
 18 Archaeological Resources Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa–470mm (2012). 
 19 Native American Graves Protection Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–3012 (2012). 
 20 For example, 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2012) (criminal forfeiture of smuggled items); 19 
U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) (2012) (civil forfeiture of merchandise that has been “stolen, 
smuggled or clandestinely imported or introduced”); and 19 U.S.C. § 2609 (2012) (civil 
forfeiture of cultural property imported in violation of the CPIA). 
 21 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(discussing Customs Directive No. 5230-15 which “advised customs officials to determine 
whether property was subject to a claim of foreign ownership” prior to seizing the 
property). 
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equivalent of stealing.22  However, if the property was merely 
removed in violation of a foreign export law, it will not be 
considered “actionable” under U.S. law “for that reason alone.”23  
Therefore, a valid provenance showing that cultural property was 
removed from a country at a time when it had no patrimony law in 
force provides a defense to a claim by the country for the property’s 
return, forfeiture allegations based on importation of stolen 
property, or criminal charges based on dealing in stolen property.24 
B. The Knowledge Element of the NSPA 
The main criminal law that should concern art market 
participants, setting aside laws which criminalize conduct during 
importation, is the NSPA.  The NSPA, codified at Sections 2314 
and 2315 of Title 18 of the United States Code, criminalizes a broad 
swath of commercial activities.25  Section 2314 criminalizes the 
movement of stolen property across a state or national border, while 
Section 2315 criminalizes its subsequent receipt, possession, 
concealment, storage, bartering, sale or disposition of stolen 
property.26  Both statutes include, as an element of the crime, that 
the stolen property crossed interstate or international boundaries, an 
inevitability with foreign cultural property in the United States.27 
This Comment considers how the mens rea element of the 
NSPA—knowledge—might be satisfied through a purchasing 
dealer or collector’s conscious avoidance.  The starting point of this 
inquiry is the language of the NSPA itself.  The NSPA language 
applicable to cultural property is as follows: 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2314 
Whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate or foreign 
commerce any goods, wares, merchandise . . . of the value of 
 
 22 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 410 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
NSPA applies to property stolen in violation of a foreign patrimony law whose language 
and enforcement shows that it was intended to assert true ownership over the property); 
see also United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000–01 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding “that 
a declaration of national ownership is necessary before illegal exportation of an article can 
be considered theft, and the exported article considered ‘stolen,’ within the meaning of the 
[NSPA]”). 
 23 McClain, 545 F.2d at 996. 
 24 See Schultz, 333 F.3d at 393. 
 25 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2012). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
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$5,000 or more, knowing the same to have been stolen, converted 
or taken by fraud . . . . Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned 
not more than ten years, or both . . . .28 
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2315 
Whoever receives, possesses, conceals, stores, barters, sells, or 
disposes of any goods, wares, or merchandise . . . of the value of 
$5,000 or more . . . which have crossed a State or United States 
boundary after being stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken, 
knowing the same to have been stolen, unlawfully converted, or 
taken . . . . Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more 
than ten years, or both . . . .29 
The knowledge element of the NSPA relates to the actor’s 
knowledge that the goods were stolen or unlawfully or fraudulently 
taken.30  More specifically, Section 2314 provides that the 
perpetrator must know that the property has been “stolen, converted 
or taken by fraud.”31  Section 2315 contains similar but slightly 
different language: “stolen, unlawfully converted, or taken.”32  
Courts interpreting the NSPA have found that despite these 
differences, both sections apply to “all felonious takings” that 
deprive an owner of her property “regardless of whether or not the 
theft constitutes common-law larceny.”33  Knowledge can be 
proven not only by evidence of actual awareness of certain facts, 
but through evidence that the defendant consciously avoided 
learning those facts.34  The conscious avoidance theory will be 
discussed in more detail below. 
In the context of cultural property, direct knowledge that 
 
 28 Id. § 2314. 
 29 Id. § 2315. 
 30 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 411 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 31 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012). 
 32 Id. § 2315. 
 33 See United States v. McClintic, 570 F.2d 685, 688 (8th Cir. 1978); see also United 
States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (defining conversion 
in Section 2314 as “the unauthorized and wrongful exercise of dominion and control over 
another’s personal property, to exclusion of or inconsistent with the rights of the owner”). 
 34 See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that 
deliberate ignorance or conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth is enough to prove 
an element of knowledge); United States v. Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(“[I]t is not inconsistent for a court to give a charge on both willful blindness and actual 
knowledge, for if the jury does not find the existence of actual knowledge, it might still 
find willful blindness.”). 
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previously documented works were stolen may be available through 
stolen art databases, news reports, or other sources.  Knowledge that 
undocumented property was stolen may be difficult to come by; 
market participants often look to circumstantial evidence to assess 
the legal status of a piece and the validity of a proffered provenance.  
For example, country-specific “red lists” of cultural objects at risk 
issued by the International Council of Museums (“ICOM”) can raise 
awareness that a class of artifacts is likely to include stolen pieces.35 
C. The Conscious Avoidance Doctrine 
Conscious avoidance is often used interchangeably with “willful 
blindness” or “deliberate ignorance.”36  At its base, the doctrine 
stands for the proposition that “a defendant’s affirmative efforts to 
‘see no evil’ and ‘hear no evil’ do not somehow magically invest 
him with the ability to ‘do no evil.’”37 
As courts discussing conscious avoidance have not adopted a 
single articulation of the doctrine, for purposes of discussing its 
application to stolen cultural property, this Comment adopts the 
following model federal jury instruction: 
In determining whether the defendant acted knowingly, you 
may consider whether the defendant deliberately closed his eyes 
to what would otherwise have been obvious to him.  If you find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with (or that 
the defendant’s ignorance was solely and entirely the result of) a 
conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth (e.g., that the 
statement was false), then this element may be satisfied.  
However, guilty knowledge may not be established by 
demonstrating that the defendant was merely negligent, foolish, 
or mistaken. 
 
 35 Red Lists Database, INT’L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS, 
https://icom.museum/en/resources/red-lists/ [https://perma.cc/FH9T-RMPR] (providing 
drop-down filters for searching for red listed items and hosts copies of PDFs for various 
particular red lists, such as “Emergency Red List of Cultural Objects at Risk – Yemen”). 
 36 KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG, & HON. WILLIAM C. LEE, FEDERAL JURY 
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS, § 17:09 “Deliberate ignorance—Explained” (6th ed. 2019) 
(“This type of ‘deliberate ignorance’ or ‘conscious avoidance’ instruction, sometimes also 
called a ‘Jewell’ or ‘ostrich’ instruction should only be given ‘when the defendant claims 
a lack of guilty knowledge and there are facts and evidence that support an inference of 
deliberate ignorance.’”) (quoting United States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829, 106 S.Ct. 92, 88 L.Ed.2d 76 (1985)). 
 37 United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 218 n.26 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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If you find that the defendant was aware of a high probability 
that (e.g., the statement was false) and that the defendant acted 
with deliberate disregard of the facts, you may find that the 
defendant acted knowingly.  However, if you find that the 
defendant actually believed that (e.g., the statement was true), he 
may not be convicted.38 
To summarize, conscious avoidance may be found where a 
defendant (1) was aware of a high probability that the fact was true, 
and (2) acted with a conscious purpose of avoiding learning the 
truth.39  Further, a defendant will not be found to have consciously 
avoided knowledge if a factfinder concludes that he actually 
believed that the fact was not true or that the defendant was merely 
negligent, foolish, or mistaken.40 
In a criminal case charging a violation of the NSPA, the 
government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an object 
was stolen.41  The defendant’s knowledge that the object was stolen 
would be the subject of a conscious avoidance instruction.42  A 
factfinder may decide that a defendant meets the knowledge 
standard if the government proves that the defendant was aware of 
the high probability that the property was stolen and deliberately 
disregarded available information or avoided learning facts that 
would have made the property’s legal status obvious.43  The 
defendant may counter evidence of conscious avoidance by arguing 
that either the defendant actually believed that the property was not 
stolen or “was merely negligent, foolish or mistaken.”44  The 
sophistication, experience and past practices of the defendant in the 
cultural property market, and whether the defendant sought and 
received advice, will be relevant to a factfinder’s consideration of 
 
 38 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL, ¶ 3A.01, Scienter, Instruction 
3A-2 Conscious Avoidance: Deliberately Closing Eyes (Matthew Bender 2019) (citing 
Supreme Court and Circuit Court authorities)  [hereinafter Scienter Instructions]. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012). 
 42 See United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 413–14 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 43 Whether or not the defendant’s inquiry would have resulted in actual knowledge 
is not the relevant inquiry.  United States v. Nektalov, 461 F.3d 309, 315 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he applicability of the doctrine does not turn on the truth of the particular proposition 
in question, but on what the defendant does to avoid reaching subjective certainty 
(mistaken or not) about that proposition.”). 
 44 See Scienter Instructions, supra note 38. 
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this defense.45 
To warrant the conscious avoidance instruction at trial, “(a) the 
element of knowledge must be in dispute and (b) the evidence 
would permit a rational juror to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in 
dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact.”46  The 
instruction may not be given if the “evidence alerting a defendant to 
the high probability of criminal activity”—here, theft—is “direct 
evidence of the illegality itself,” as this would result in a defendant’s 
actual knowledge of the theft.47  If, on the other hand, the evidence 
of theft is circumstantial, the instruction can be given in the 
alternative as circumstantial evidence which “can be used to show 
both actual knowledge and conscious avoidance.”48 
III. Practical Considerations in Cultural Property 
Transactions: Provenance and Red Flags 
A. Evolving Expectations Regarding Provenance 
Provenances are not standardized in law or practice and are 
therefore inconsistent in appearance, contents, and level of detail.49  
A typical provenance takes the form of a typed entry on a seller’s 
invoice or letterhead.50  It may or may not be supported by 
 
 45 See United States v. Lumiere, 249 F. Supp. 3d 748, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (stating 
that the knowledge element is subjective, not objective); cf. Schultz, 333 F.3d at 416 
(taking into account Schultz’s expertise “in the field of Egyptian antiquities [and] many 
years of experience” in determining whether he had actual knowledge of Egypt’s 
patrimony law). 
 46 Lumiere, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2017), appeal withdrawn, No. 17-2010, 
2017 WL 9732075 (2d Cir. Oct. 11, 2017). 
 47 Nektalov, 461 F.3d at 316 (noting that “a conscious avoidance instruction is ‘not 
appropriate’” in such circumstances) (quoting United States v. Sanchez–Robles, 927 F.2d 
1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 48 United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 278 (2d Cir. 2011).  See United States v. 
Wert-Ruiz, 228 F.3d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 49 Jane A. Levine, The Importance of Provenance Documentation in the Market for 
Ancient Art and Artifacts: The Future of the Market May Depend on Documenting the 
Past, 19 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 219, 229 (2009) (noting the lack of 
“accepted consensus surrounding the type of documentation and the nature of the evidence 
that buyers and sellers will accept as proof of ownership history”). 
 50 Id. at 229; see, e.g., De Sole v. Knoedler Gallery, LLC, 139 F. Supp. 3d 618, 628 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (provenance included on gallery invoices); Duchossois Indus., Inc. v. 
Stelloh, No. 87 C 4132, 1988 WL 2794, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 1988) (provenance written 
on the seller’s stationery). 
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documentary evidence such as sales receipts, publications in 
museum, gallery or auction catalogs, customs declarations, and 
even family photographs.51  The fact that provenances can be 
generated by anyone means they can be easily faked by the 
unscrupulous.52  Moreover, many provenances are difficult to verify 
through due diligence, as collectors and dealers are traditionally 
secretive; a typical provenance lists prior owners as “private 
collectors” located in particular countries or cities.53  These 
monikers could represent good-faith attempts to preserve the 
privacy of sellers and restrict access to the dealers’ legitimate 
sources.  On the other hand, they could be fraudulently invented to 
disguise an incomplete history that would dissuade a potential buyer 
or, worse, to cover up a known history that is problematic.  For 
example, a buyer might not purchase a piece if the first recorded 
owner on the provenance was a dealer who is widely believed to 
have trafficked in looted artifacts. 
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting 
and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership 
of Cultural Property (the “1970 UNESCO Convention”), which 
addressed methods to prevent cultural property trafficking, return 
looted property, and foster international cooperation, marked a 
turning point in the treatment of provenance.54  After the 1970 
UNESCO Convention was promulgated, many professionals in the 
 
 51 Levine, supra note 49, at 231. 
 52 See Provenance Guide, supra note 4.  See, e.g., Catherine Hickley, Germany’s $14 
Million Art Forgers Jailed for Total 15 Years, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 27, 2011, 9:07 AM) 
(reporting that the criminals “even forged family photographs from the 1930s, showing 
paintings hanging in the background, with [defendant] posing as her grandmother, to 
convince potential buyers that the provenance was authentic”). 
 53 Multiple art market participants and academics have proposed registration systems 
for cultural property to address issues of both authenticity and ownership going forward.  
See, e.g., Jennifer Anglim Kreder & Benjamin A. Bauer, Protecting Property Rights and 
Unleashing Capital in Art, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 881, 885 (2011) (proposing a Federal 
Bureau of Cultural Property Registration); Derek Fincham, Assessing the Viability of 
Blockchain to Impact the Antiquities Trade, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 605, 622–24 
(2019) (describing initiatives to integrate blockchain and the cultural property trade); 
William G. Pearlstein, White Paper: A Proposal to Reform U.S. Law and Policy Relating 
to the International Exchange of Cultural Property, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 561, 
579 (2014) (proposing an electronic database in which insufficiently documented objects 
can be published anonymously and become “free and clear of any claims” if the country 
of origin does not claim the object within one year). 
 54 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231. 
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archaeological and ancient art market voluntarily adopted standards 
which recognize 1970 as an ethical line in the sand; objects for 
which there is no documentation showing they were removed from 
their source country before 1970 or legally exported after 1970 are 
subject to higher scrutiny.55  In 1973, the Archaeological Institute 
of America (“AIA”) adopted a resolution discouraging museums 
from acquiring pieces collected from that point forward “in 
violation of the laws obtaining in the countries of origin.”56  The 
AIA and its publication, the American Journal of Archaeology 
(“AJA”), also barred the use of the AIA annual meeting and AJA as 
fora for initial announcements or publication of research concerning 
objects that did not meet the AIA’s antiquities policy.57  In 2008, 
the American Alliance of Museums (“AAM”) issued a guideline 
“recommend[ing] that museums require documentation that [an] 
object was out of its probable country of modern discovery by 
November 17, 1970.”58  Likewise, in 2013, the Association of Art 
Museum Directors (“AAMD”) issued guidelines adopting 1970 “as 
a threshold for a more rigorous analysis of provenance 
information.”59  Over time, many market participants and observers 
began to view 1970 as a dividing line for ethical collecting, though 
empirical research suggests that the “1970 standard” has not had a 
clear impact on the sale of antiquities.60 
While the 1970 UNESCO Convention impacted the treatment 
 
 55 See Patty Gerstenblith, The Meaning of 1970 for the Acquisition of Archaeological 
Objects, 38 J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 4, 364 (2013) (describing “the 1970 standard”). 
 56 Resolution on the Acquisition of Antiquities by Museums, ARCHAEOLOGICAL 
INST. OF AM. (Dec. 19, 1973), https://www.archaeological.org/resolution-on-the-
acquisition-of-antiquities-by-museums/ [https://perma.cc/MJB3-ZBCW]. 
 57 See Gerstenblith, supra note 55, at 365 (discussing the use of the 1970 UNESECO 
Convention as an ethical guide by professional organizations). 
 58 Archaeological Material and Ancient Art, AM. ALL. OF MUSEUMS (July 2008), 
https://www.aam-us.org/programs/ethics-standards-and-professional-
practices/archaeological-material-and-ancient-art/ [https://perma.cc/9TD2-SW7X]. 
 59 Guidelines on the Acquisition of Archaeological Material and Ancient Art, AM. 
ALL. OF MUSEUMS (2013) (discouraging members from acquiring an object “unless 
provenance research substantiates that the Work was outside its country of probable 
modern discovery before 1970 or was legally exported from its probable country of 
modern discovery after 1970,” and allowing members to exercise their judgment with 
respect to pieces lacking complete provenances). 
 60 See Lauren Baker, Controlling the Market: An Analysis of the 1970 UNESCO Rule 
on Acquisition and the Market for Unprovenanced Antiquities, 52 STAN. J. INT’L L. 321, 
332 (2016). 
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of provenance by the art and archaeology community after 1970, the 
market arguably had lower expectations about documenting 
ownership in connection with pre-1970 transactions.61  
Accordingly, the recorded history of prior owners and sellers, even 
for legally owned property, may trail off prior to that date, leading 
to the quandary of “orphaned” pieces.62  Orphaned cultural property 
consists of art or artifacts with insufficient provenance to satisfy 
current ethical standards.63  Between the risk that a seller of these 
antiquities is not passing along good title,64 and the fact that a 
significant portion of the cultural property community has 
voluntarily agreed not to promote or engage in transactions 
involving such property, the market value of orphans can be reduced 
and their current owners may find it difficult to find new homes for 
these objects.65  Nonetheless, the lack of a pre-1970 provenance 
alone does not render a transaction illegal and orphaned property 
continues to be purchased by those willing to assume some risk.66 
B. Potential of Red Flags in Cultural Property Transactions 
The following potential red flags in cultural property 
transactions have been identified by courts in New York, one of the 
largest and most significant art markets67: 
 
 61 See Levine, supra note 49, at 229–30. 
 62 See William G. Pealstein, White Paper: A proposal to Reform U.S. Law and Policy 
Relating to the International Exchange of Cultural Property, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 561, 570 n.20 (2014) (estimating that “hundreds of thousands” or a “million or more” 
objects became “orphans” following the AAMD’s adoption of the “1970 Rule”). 
 63 See Richard M. Leventhal & Brian I. Daniels, “Orphaned Objects,” Ethical 
Standards, and the Acquisition of Antiquities, 23 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
L. 339, 347 (2013). 
 64 Some possessors of stolen property have argued that they acquired valid title by 
operation of foreign laws.  See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(possessor of disputed drawing argued that under Swiss law a prior purchaser acquired 
valid legal title after five years passed without a prior owner claiming the property).  
However, if a claim is lodged after the disputed property has been imported into the United 
States, U.S. courts choose to apply local laws which typically bar a thief’s downstream 
purchasers from ever acquiring good title to the stolen property.  See, e.g., id. at 140–46 
(holding that New York law preventing a thief from passing good title, rather than Swiss 
law, governed the ownership of Nazi-looted art); In re Newpower, 233 F.3d 922, 929 (6th 
Cir. 2000) (noting the “proposition, long established at common law, that a thief has no 
title in the property that he steals”). 
 65 See Leventhal & Daniels, supra note 63, at 350. 
 66 See id. at 352. 
 67 See, e.g., Biro v. Nast, No. 11 Civ. 4442 JPO, 2012 WL 3262770, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. 
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(1) whether the sale price is obviously below market, (2) whether 
the negotiations or procedure of the sale differed from previous 
transactions between buyer and seller, (3) whether the buyer was 
aware of the seller’s financial difficulties, or (4) whether the 
buyer would have reason to doubt the seller’s ownership of the 
artwork.68 
Additional red flags in the sale of art and artifacts could include 
the following: fresh chisel marks; a previously unknown hoard of 
cultural artifacts from a heavily looted region; the appearance at the 
start of a provenance chain of a person known for possessing or 
trafficking in stolen cultural property; use of a country of origin that 
would be unusual for the artifact and which does not have a 
longstanding patrimony law; existence of multiple, inconsistent 
versions of the provenance; the appearance of the type of cultural 
property on a “red list” for a country with longstanding patrimony 
laws; and concerning remarks made by the seller, such as 
discouraging further investigation. 
IV.  Applying the Conscious Avoidance Doctrine to Red Flags 
in Cultural Property Transactions 
There is clear precedent for applying the conscious avoidance 
doctrine to the knowledge element of the NSPA in the context of 
stolen cultural property.  United States v. Schultz, a leading case 
concerning cultural property and the NSPA, involved appellate 
review of a conscious avoidance instruction.69  In Schultz, the issue 
was not whether Egyptian artifacts had been recently removed from 
Egypt; Schultz and Parry were well aware of the origin of their 
pieces and had created false provenances.70  Instead, the fact at issue 
was whether Schultz was aware of an Egyptian patrimony law that 
vested ownership of these artifacts in the state.71 
Another leading cultural property case involving the conscious 
avoidance doctrine and the NSPA is United States v. Portrait of 
 
Aug. 10, 2012) (referencing “the centrality of New York City to the global art market”). 
 68 Overton v. Art Fin. Partners LLC, 166 F. Supp. 3d 388, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) 
(noting that these “possible red flags” have been identified by courts applying New York 
law as triggering a “duty of heightened inquiry in the art industry”). 
 69 United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 412–14 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 70 Id. at 396. 
 71 Id. at 416 (“Schultz’s defense at trial was that he was unaware of the existence of 
Law 117 [Egypt’s patrimony law].”). 
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Wally, a civil forfeiture action involving Egon Schiele’s painting of 
Valerie Neuzil.72  Had Portrait of Wally proceeded to trial, an issue 
for the jury would have been whether one of the key figures in the 
case “knew, or consciously avoided knowing” that the painting was 
stolen based on his interactions with the victim.73 
This Comment focuses on how a downstream purchaser who, 
unlike the actors in Schultz and Portrait of Wally, lacks direct 
knowledge of a piece’s history would fare under a conscious 
avoidance standard.  The buyer’s awareness of an earlier theft—or 
conscious avoidance of that fact—would be based on information 
provided by the seller, the buyer’s due diligence, and the buyer’s 
interpretation of circumstantial evidence. 
To explore how the conscious avoidance doctrine may be 
applied in the context of stolen cultural property, this Comment 
presents three hypothetical situations.  As we proceed through the 
scenarios, keep in mind that red flags, or circumstantial evidence of 
theft, “can be used to show both actual knowledge and conscious 
avoidance.”74  In addition, as the charge under consideration is a 
violation of the National Stolen Property Act, the reader should 
assume that the government can prove that the subject of each 
proposed transaction was, in fact, stolen and then moved across state 
or international borders. 
A. Scenario One: The Sale of Ancient Egyptian Artifacts 
In this scenario, a seller offers a collection of hundreds of 
Egyptian scarabs and shabtis to a buyer.  A scarab is a small carved 
stone or ceramic piece molded in the shape of a scarab beetle, an 
insect that had religious and cultural significance to ancient 
Egyptians.75  The flat bottoms of scarabs were generally engraved 
so that they created a raised image when pressed into clay.76  A 
shabti is a small figurine in the shape of a mummified person.77  
 
 72 United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 73 Id. at 269–71. 
 74 United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 278 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 75 Kierra Foley, Scarabs, JOHNS HOPKINS ARCHAEOLOGICAL MUSEUM, 
http://archaeologicalmuseum.jhu.edu/the-collection/object-stories/ancient-egyptian-
amulets/scarabs/ [https://perma.cc/5RHW-MUZD]. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Joshua J. Mark, Shabti Dolls: The Workforce in the Afterlife, ANCIENT HIST. 
ENCYC. (Jan. 18, 2012), https://www.ancient.eu/article/119/shabti-dolls-the-workforce-in-
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Shabtis were buried with ancient Egyptians who believed that the 
figures would become their servants in the afterlife.78  Shabtis were 
commonly made of glazed or painted ceramic, but were also 
fashioned from stone, wood, and other materials.79  Shabtis are 
included in the ICOM Red List of Egyptian Cultural Objects at 
Risk.80  Both artifacts—scarabs and shabtis—existed in large 
numbers in ancient Egypt and continue to be found in modern 
excavations.  Egypt has a patrimony law recognized in U.S. courts,81 
but many excavation sites have nonetheless been looted since it 
went into effect, with evidence of looting dramatically increasing 
beginning in 2009.82 
Upon the buyer’s request, the seller provides a provenance 
indicating that the collection was established before 1970, outside 
of Egypt, by the current seller’s father and grandfather.  No 
documentation supporting this provenance is available besides the 
seller’s statement.  The artifacts have not been exhibited or 
mentioned in any catalogs or publications.  The seller’s price is on 
the low end for the type of artifact on a per item basis, which the 
seller explains is because the buyer is willing to purchase them in 
bulk.  The total purchase price has six digits. 
In our example, there are two key facts that should cause a buyer 
to be aware of a high probability that the artifacts are looted.  First, 
shabtis are listed in the ICOM Red List of Egyptian Cultural Objects 
at Risk because they are among the “categories or types of 
[Egyptian] cultural items that are most likely to be illegally bought 
and sold.”83  Second, the sale involves a large group of small, 
common items.84  Wary buyers may suspect that the offered 
 
the-afterlife/ [https://perma.cc/84JY-QH6V]. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Emergency Red List of Egyptian Cultural Objects at Risk, INT’L COUNCIL OF 
MUSEUMS, https://icom.museum/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/120521_ERLE_EN-
Pages.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PA7-3C73] [hereinafter ICOM Red List of Egyptian Cultural 
Objects at Risk]. 
 81 See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 402 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that 
Egyptian Law 117 clearly and unambiguously vests ownership of antiquities found in 
Egypt after 1983 in the Egyptian government and that Egypt actively enforced the law). 
 82 See Sarah Parcak, et al., Satellite Evidence of Archaeological Site Looting in 
Egypt: 2002–2013, 90 ANTIQUITY 349, 193 (2016). 
 83 ICOM Red List of Egyptian Cultural Objects at Risk, supra note 80, at 2, 4. 
 84 See, e.g., Sarah Birnbaum, Hobby Lobby Ignored ‘Red Flags’ About Stolen Iraqi 
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property is a hoard of artifacts found together far more recently than 
1970.85  Arguably, the reference to “before 1970” in the provenance 
is also a red flag as the date conveniently meets the 1970 standard 
adopted by museum and archaeology professionals, despite the 
seller offering no evidence supporting an acquisition by this date.86 
Would the buyer recognize these issues or be aware of the recent 
looting of Egyptian antiquities?  The standard, after all, requires a 
subjective belief or awareness.87  Perhaps the buyer is a novice,88 
but then why is the buyer purchasing so many similar objects for 
such a large sum of money?  Why is the buyer interested in these 
items?  What investigation has he or she done that might have 
informed the buyer of issues surrounding the illicit market in these 
artifacts?  Has the buyer consulted with an expert in cultural 
property importation or in Egyptian artifacts in particular?  What 
advice did the buyer receive?  These are the types of facts that a 
factfinder would consider in determining whether the buyer was 
aware of the high probability that the artifacts were looted. 
If the buyer’s awareness of the potential looting is established, 
the next step is to determine whether the buyer took steps to avoid 
learning that the objects were, in fact, looted.89  We start by 
considering what the buyer could have done in this scenario to 
investigate the seller’s limited provenance.  For example, the buyer 
could have asked the seller to speak with other members of the 
seller’s family about the family’s collecting history and ask if 
 
Artifacts, PUB. RADIO INT’L (July 6, 2017, 2:15 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-07-
06/hobby-lobby-ignored-red-flags-about-stolen-iraqi-artifacts [https://perma.cc/YG7E-
HDUR] (“[A] massive scale — over 5,000 antiquities. ‘There’s no place for it to come 
from in a legal way.’”). 
 85 See, e.g., id. (“[O]bjects that would have had to have left Iraq maybe 100 years 
ago for them to be fully legal.  And there are just so few of those.  So, if somebody comes 
up to you saying they have 3,000 Iraqi tablets to sell you and we didn’t know about them 
beforehand, you should really expect that they’re loot.”). 
 86 See Guidelines on the Acquisition of Archaeological Material and Ancient Art, 
supra note 59; see generally Gerstenblith, supra note 55, at 364 (discussing “the 1970 
Standard”). 
 87 See United States v. Lumiere, 249 F. Supp. 3d 748, 766 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) 
(discussing the element of subjective awareness).  
 88 See, e.g., United States v. Schultz, 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(acknowledging that experts in the field are held to a higher standard of knowledge). 
 89 See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 701 (9th Cir. 1976); O’MALLEY, 
GRENIG, & LEE, supra note 36, § 17:09 (describing “deliberate ignorance”). 
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anyone else recalled these objects.90  Perhaps the buyer could have 
interrogated the seller on details of the collection—where had it 
been stored, what precautions were taken to prevent breakage, and 
who else has seen the pieces.91 
B. Scenario Two: The Sale of a Painting by a Modern Artist 
In this second scenario, we turn to a transaction involving 
documented cultural property whose history may be easier to trace.  
A buyer is considering the purchase of an oil-on-canvas painting by 
an artist who sold her works in Europe in the years between World 
Wars I and II through a gallery.  The provenance lists only the 
immediate prior owner who is identified as an anonymous Swiss 
collector who acquired it on the Swiss art market in 1975.  No prior 
owners are mentioned.  The price is consistent with similar works 
by the artist.  The painting is being offered by a well-regarded 
London gallery. 
A wary buyer should be concerned by the limited and vague 
provenance provided for a modern piece.  The natural concern, 
based on the sale of a piece prior to World War II, is that the artwork 
could have been stolen from or been the subject of a forced sale by 
persons persecuted by the Nazi regime.92  If the buyer does not take 
 
 90 See, e.g., United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d 232, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (“Belvedere had cause to suspect that Wally did not belong to the Rieger heirs 
because when Garzarolli, Balke, Novotny, and Broda’s secretary inspected the works 
restituted to the Rieger heirs to determine whether the Belvedere should acquire them, they 
described Wally as ‘Portrait of a Woman,’ while handwritten notes indicate they knew it 
depicted ‘Wally Neuzil from Vienna.’”). 
 91 See, e.g., Porter v. Wertz, 68 A.D.2d 141, 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (“Had Ms. 
Drew-Bear done so much as call either of the telephone numbers Wertz had left, she would 
have learned that Wertz was employed by a delicatessen and was not an art dealer.”); 
Complaint at ¶ 25 and Statement of Facts at ¶ 6, United States v. Approx. 540 Ancient 
Cuneiform Tablets, Docket no. 17-CV-3980 (LDH) (E.D.N.Y.) (despite the inclusion in 
the provenance of two telephone numbers for a person in Mississippi who purportedly 
stored the artifacts since the 1970s, Hobby Lobby did not attempt to contact the alleged 
custodian to confirm this provenance, which was, in fact, false). 
 92 See Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 242 (The court held that even if Bondi 
had sold Wally to Welz, it was a forced sale due to Nazi persecution).  See generally Anne 
Rothfeld, Nazi Looted Art: The Holocaust Records Preservation Project, 34 PROLOGUE 2 
(Summer 2002) (providing additional information regarding Nazi Art Confiscations); 
Soffia H. Kuehner Gray, The Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 2016: An 
Ineffective Remedy for Returning Nazi-Looted Art, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 368 (2019) 
(“A provenance gap in a painting could indicate that it probably changed hands under the 
Nazis or was even just stolen by the Nazi regime.”). 
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steps to check the artwork against a registry that would include 
Holocaust era items, a factfinder may well conclude that the buyer 
deliberately closed his or her eyes to learning that the painting was 
stolen.93  Efforts to authenticate paintings through catalogues 
raisonnés or experts are also reasonable steps that can yield 
provenance information.94  A failure to use these resources could be 
deemed suspect. 
Querying public databases such as the Interpol Stolen Works of 
Art database95 or inquiring with databases such as the Art Loss 
Register (“ALR”)96 or the Artive Database97 can tell a prospective 
buyer if an object has been reported stolen.  Visual searches for 
suspected stolen Italian cultural property can be conducted using the 
“iTPC” smartphone application provided by the Carabinieri 
Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage (known by its 
Italian initials as the “TPC”).98  While these queries may be deemed 
 
 93 See Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 272 (finding that the seller knew that 
Bondi owned Wally before prior to fleeing Nazi persecution and “never sought any sort of 
documentary confirmation or attempted to contact the Rieger heirs or question Bondi 
himself”). 
 94 See generally Provenance Guide, supra note 4 (An artist’s catalogue raisonné is a 
“detailed compilation of an artist’s work and often includes some provenance information, 
exhibition history, publication references, attributions, current owners, and identifying 
features of the work, such as dimensions, inscriptions and condition.”). 
 95 Stolen Works of Art, INTERPOL, https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Cultural-
heritage-crime/Stolen-Works-of-Art-Database [https://perma.cc/NXU8-WYL9] (The 
Stolen Works of Art Database is an international database with descriptions and pictures 
of more than 50,000 stolen works of art provided by authorized authorities. It is Interpol’s 
main tool to combat the trafficking of cultural property).   
 96 The Art Loss Register, INT’L ART & ANTIQUE LOSS REG. LTD., 
https://www.artloss.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/W4JP-9ARB] (“The [Art Loss 
Register] is the world’s largest private database of lost and stolen art, antiques, and 
collectables.”). 
 97 ARTIVE, https://www.artive.org [https://perma.cc/ZS3M-E8KT] (The Artive 
Database is used as a research platform to combat illicit activities by promoting due 
diligence). 
 98 See Carabinieri for the Protection of Cultural Heritage and Anti-Counterfeiting, 
MINISTERO DELLA DIFESA, https://www.carabinieri.it/multilingua/en/english/carabinieri-
for-the-protection-of-cultural-heritage-and-anti-counterfeiting [https://perma.cc/U8JM-
2RYL] (The Comando Carabinieri per la Tutela del Patrimonio Culturale (Carabinieri 
Command for the Protection of Cultural Heritage, in English) was created in 1969 to 
combat looting); Andrew Lokay, Brigadier General Fabrizio Parrulli, Director of the 
Carabinieri Art Squad, Speaks at the Smithsonian, ANTIQUITIES COALITION (Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://theantiquitiescoalition.org/brigadier-general-parrulli-smithsonian/ 
[https://perma.cc/YZ6V-L2DM] (The iTPC smartphone application allows users to “input 
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sufficient to support a good faith belief that a documented painting 
or modern artwork was not stolen, a factfinder may not be persuaded 
that the belief was actually held with respect to undocumented 
artifacts.  Artifacts that have been looted from the ground without 
any record made of their discovery will not be listed in such 
databases.99  At any rate, the conscious avoidance defense does not 
depend on whether a belief is reasonably held, but whether a 
factfinder concludes that, reasonable or not, it was actually held by 
the defendant.100 
C. Scenario Three: The Sale of an Ancient Roman Statue 
In this scenario, a seller presents a provenance for an ancient 
Roman statue that recounts that the statue has been held in an 
anonymous private collection for the past 80 years.  The statue is 
not on display, but is crated at the time it is shown to the buyer.  The 
buyer notices that there is sandy soil on the bottom of the crate and 
the statue’s feet are missing.  Italy has a 1909 law governing 
movable cultural property discovered pursuant to official 
government excavations, and a 1939 law which provides for state 
ownership of any discovered cultural property, regardless of how it 
is discovered.101  These laws are actively enforced by the TPC.102 
In this case, several facts should cause the buyer to be concerned 
about the provenance.  First, a piece that has been privately held for 
80 years is expected to be clean with no dirt clinging to it that might 
 
a photo of a work of art and search for a match in its database of stolen cultural property.”). 
 99 See Derek Fincham, Assessing the Viability of Blockchain to Impact the 
Antiquities Trade, 37 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 605, 625 (2019) (noting the misuse of 
ALR certificates by dealers and noting that “for antiquities, the [ALR] would not be 
equipped to offer meaningful advice, as newly looted or forged antiquities would never be 
able to be flagged by their database”). 
 100 See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 635 F.3d 590, 602 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
belief held by the defendant need not be reasonable in order for it to defeat a conscious 
avoidance theory of actual knowledge.”); United States v. Catano-Alzate, 62 F.3d 41, 43 
(2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he doctrine of conscious avoidance does not permit a finding of guilty 
knowledge if the defendant actually did not believe that he or she was involved in the 
transportation of drugs, however irrational that belief may have been.”). 
 101 Legge 1 giguno 1939, n.1089(43)–(49), G.U. Aug. 8, 1939, n.184 (It.); Legge 20 
giguno 1909, n.364(15), G.U. June 28, 1909, n. 150 (It.). 
 102 See Carabinieri for the Protection of Cultural Heritage and Anti-Counterfeiting, 
supra note 98 (containing websites describing TPC’s efforts, successes, and leadership in 
combatting illicit cultural property trafficking in Italy and internationally). 
2020 RISKING CRIMINAL LIABILITY 547 
fall off in transit.103  A statue held this long is also more likely to 
have been made public by its owner through exhibition or 
publication.  Second, a statue broken at a weak point such as the 
ankles or neck could indicate that the piece was severed from a 
larger piece; dissecting a statue is not the expected conduct of an 
owner looking to preserve the value of his property.104  The buyer 
should, therefore, look to see if the break near the ankles appears 
new, or whether the statue was more likely broken in antiquity.105  
In addition, the assertion of private ownership for “80 years” is 
suspicious considering that at the time of the offer, the 1939 
patrimony law was approximately 80 years old. 
Depending on the overall facts of the case, a factfinder might 
conclude that these red flags are enough to find that the buyer 
actually knew the statue was stolen.  Alternatively, the factfinder 
may conclude that these facts are sufficient to cause the buyer to be 
aware of a high probability that the statue was stolen.  If the buyer 
deliberately makes no further inquiry to determine the legality of 
the sale, knowledge of the illegality may be established via 
conscious avoidance. 
V. Conclusion 
As the Schultz and Portrait of Wally cases show, the conscious 
avoidance doctrine applies to transactions involving cultural 
property that violate the National Stolen Property Act.  While these 
 
 103 See, e.g., Georgi Kantchev, Buyer Beware: Looted Antiquities Flood Online Sites 
Like Amazon and Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 1, 2017, 4:46 AM) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-online-bazaar-for-looted-antiquities-
1509466087?mod=e2fb [https://perma.cc/HKM2-K26Q] (Coins being sold online as 
“uncleaned coins,” or with what experts refer to such coins as having “desert patina,” a 
mineral deposit similar to rust that often adheres to metal objects as they decay, is a 
“telltale sign they might have been recently excavated”). 
 104 See, e.g., Tom Mueller, How Tomb Raiders Are Stealing Our History, NAT’L 
GEOGRAPHIC (June 2016), 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2016/06/looting-ancient-blood-
antiquities/#close [perma.cc/VU9B-SVR4] (In the Khouli case, an Egyptian sarcophagus 
was found in New York with “fresh cuts across [it’s] upper thighs” where looters had made 
a transverse cut across the sarcophagus so that it could be transported to the United States 
in four pieces.); Complaint, United States v. A 10th Century Cambodian Sandstone 
Sculpture, No. 12 Civ. 2600,  2012 WL 1120480 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2012) (seeking 
forfeiture of a 10th century Khmer statue which had been “broken off at the ankles” from 
its pedestal outside a temple in Cambodia). 
 105 See, e.g., Mueller, supra note 104 (fresh cuts on a wooden sarcophagus). 
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cases involved buyers with some direct knowledge of wrongdoing, 
the doctrine can be equally applied where the knowledge of a 
downstream buyer is placed in issue.  As discussed in this 
Comment, buyers faced with red flags who choose not to investigate 
them cannot rely on deliberate ignorance as a defense to a charge 
that they knowingly transacted in or possessed stolen cultural 
property.  To the contrary, if the government proves that a buyer 
intentionally looked the other way when purchasing stolen cultural 
property, a factfinder can conclude that the buyer knowingly 
violated the NSPA.  In addition, courts may look unfavorably on 
buyers whose past experience has caused them to become familiar 
with the legal issues and red flags surrounding the cultural property 
that is the subject of the transaction. 
The collectors quoted at the beginning of this Comment 
expressed a willingness to assume risk during the purchase of 
cultural property.  To date, such collectors have considered their risk 
to be financial: the loss of the antiquities’ value, the possibility of 
being sued by a theft victim or of the objects being seized and 
forfeited by law enforcement, and any legal fees expended in 
defending such litigation.  However, it is time for participants in the 
cultural property market to recognize a more significant risk—
criminal liability for dealing in or possessing stolen property.  The 
penalty for violating the NSPA is a felony conviction punishable by 
up to ten years in prison.106  The risk of criminal liability, including 
incarceration and the collateral consequences of having a felony 
conviction, rather than potential loss of portfolio value, should be 
the foremost risk on the minds of cultural property purchasers. 
 
 106 National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–2315 (2012). 
